

# Vulnerability Analysis of Face Morphing Attacks from Landmarks and Generative Adversarial Networks

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Research Intern, Biometrics Security and Privacy, Idiap Research Institute

# Content

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- My journey to Idiap

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- Problem
- Morph Generation
- Evaluation Protocol
- Experimental Results
- Conclusion

# Morphing Attacks

A Threat to Biometric Systems




Karras, T. *et al.*, 2020. Analyzing and improving the image quality of stylegan. CVPR.


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
Morphing Attack: When two individuals' face images is combined into a single 'morphed' image using a morphing algorithm.



Identity A



Morph




Identity B




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
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
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
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
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


Identity B


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
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  - Automatic border control



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

Identity B

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
Accomplice



Criminal


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
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


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


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- Some related issues lack attention:
  - Little reported on whether latest SOTA face recognition systems remain vulnerable to typical morphing attacks.
  - Very few public datasets of 'morphed' images:
    - Advanced Multimedia Security Lab's (AMSL) Face Morph Image dataset

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- Providing new dataset with four different types of morphing attacks generated with original face images from three public face datasets.
- Conducting extensive experiments to assess the vulnerability of SOTA face recognition systems.

Milestone in our understanding of where the current SOTA morph generation algorithms and FR systems are at.

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  - Large varieties in ethnicity, pose, and expression
  - Pre-annotated with 189-landmarks



# Morph Generation - Tools


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  - FaceMorpher
  - WebMorph
  - Combined Morphs

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

- Landmark-based morphs:
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  - Combined Morphs
- Generative Adversarial Networks-based morphs:
  - StyleGAN 2

# Morph Generation - Landmarks







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
Identity A




OpenCV




FaceMorpher



WebMorph




Combined Morphs




Identity B


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
Identity A




OpenCV



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WebMorph



Combined Morphs



Identity B



# Morph Generation - StyleGAN 2

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Identity A



1. Crop source images to FFHQ alignment

Identity B



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



1. Crop source images to FFHQ alignment
2. Project images to StyleGAN's  $W$  latent space



Projection A

Identity B



Projection B







# Morph Generation - StyleGAN 2

Identity A



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Identity B



Projection A

Projection B




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



Identity A



Identity B



1. Crop source images to FFHQ alignment
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4. Feed interpolated vector back to generator



Projection A

Morph

Projection B



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
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


Identity B




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


Morph



Projection B






- Realistic looking morphs without visual artefacts


# Pipeline Summary




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- Classical Baseline Models:
  - Gabor Jet
  - Inter-Session Variability (ISV) - trained on MOBIO dataset

# Evaluation Scenarios - Morphing Attack


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Morphs as **references**:




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Morphs as **references**:



Reference: Neutral MA




Probe: Smiling BF

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
FR system hijacked during enrollment process

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
Morphs as **probes**:

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


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


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
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
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


Probe: Neutral MA

Similar to presentation attack scenario




# Evaluation Metrics



FRS: VGG, Morphing Tool: **OpenCV**

## Verification Process:


- **Genuine User**
- **Zero-Effort Imposter**
- Morph Attack Imposter



## Verification Performance:

- False Match Rate (FMR)
- False Non-Match Rate (FNMR)
- Mated-Morph Presentation Match Rate (**MMPMR**)


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FRS: VGG, Morphing Tool: FaceMorpher

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
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
# Evaluation Metrics



FRS: VGG, Morphing Tool: WebMorph

## Verification Process:


- Genuine User
- Zero-Effort Imposter
- Morph Attack Imposter



## Verification Performance:

- False Match Rate (FMR)
- False Non-Match Rate (FNMR)
- Mated-Morph Presentation Match Rate (MMPMR)


# Evaluation Metrics



FRS: VGG, Morphing Tool: StyleGAN 2

## Verification Process:

- Genuine User
- Zero-Effort Imposter
- Morph Attack Imposter



## Verification Performance:

- False Match Rate (FMR)
- False Non-Match Rate (FNMR)
- Mated-Morph Presentation Match Rate (MMPMR)

# Experimental Results

Dataset					
FRLL					
FERET					
FRGC					



# Experimental Results

Dataset	FRS					
FRLL	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FERET	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FRGC	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					

# Experimental Results

Dataset	FRS	OpenCV	FaceMorpher	StyleGAN2	WebMorph	AMSL
FRLL	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FERET	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FRGC	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					

# Experimental Results

Dataset	FRS	OpenCV	FaceMorpher	StyleGAN2	WebMorph	AMSL
FRLL	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FERET	FaceNet				N/A	N/A
	ArcFace				N/A	N/A
	VGG				N/A	N/A
	Gabor				N/A	N/A
	ISV				N/A	N/A
FRGC	FaceNet				N/A	N/A
	ArcFace				N/A	N/A
	VGG				N/A	N/A
	Gabor				N/A	N/A
	ISV				N/A	N/A

# Experimental Results

MMPMR @ FMR = 0.1%

Dataset	FRS	OpenCV	FaceMorpher	StyleGAN2	WebMorph	AMSL
FRLL	FaceNet					
	ArcFace					
	VGG					
	Gabor					
	ISV					
FERET	FaceNet				N/A	N/A
	ArcFace				N/A	N/A
	VGG				N/A	N/A
	Gabor				N/A	N/A
	ISV				N/A	N/A
FRGC	FaceNet				N/A	N/A
	ArcFace				N/A	N/A
	VGG				N/A	N/A
	Gabor				N/A	N/A
	ISV				N/A	N/A

# Experimental Results

MMPMR @ FMR = 0.1% (morphs as references — morphs as probes) [%]

Dataset	FRS	OpenCV	FaceMorpher	StyleGAN2	WebMorph	AMSL
FRLL	FaceNet	83.3 — 72.0	64.5 — 68.2	5.9 — 11.0	82.7 — 70.8	89.2 — 92.5
	ArcFace	59.8 — 73.8	57.6 — 75.3	9.8 — 18.3	60.9 — 73.8	58.0 — 79.4
	VGG	39.7 — 48.6	23.4 — 47.1	3.0 — 9.1	38.2 — 52.2	65.7 — 89.8
	Gabor	87.2 — 100.0	83.9 — 99.4	11.8 — 37.9	85.4 — 100.0	86.3 — 99.9
	ISV	59.8 — 97.8	56.1 — 96.1	9.2 — 43.6	59.5 — 97.4	55.3 — 99.9
FERET	FaceNet	41.1 — 40.6	39.9 — 40.3	1.6 — 1.3	N/A	N/A
	ArcFace	34.6 — 35.2	34.1 — 34.8	2.4 — 2.5	N/A	N/A
	VGG	22.0 — 21.0	20.5 — 18.3	2.0 — 1.5	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	66.6 — 90.9	63.7 — 88.5	1.3 — 40.8	N/A	N/A
	ISV	44.8 — 58.4	42.6 — 56.5	2.7 — 3.4	N/A	N/A
FRGC	FaceNet	6.9 — 5.9	7.0 — 5.7	1.0 — 0.7	N/A	N/A
	ArcFace	11.9 — 10.8	12.1 — 11.2	0.5 — 0.4	N/A	N/A
	VGG	5.5 — 4.5	5.1 — 4.8	0.7 — 0.4	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	7.1 — 80.8	6.7 — 81.0	0.6 — 75.8	N/A	N/A
	ISV	4.2 — 6.5	3.5 — 6.2	0.6 — 0.6	N/A	N/A

Higher score indicates higher vulnerability



# Experimental Results

MMPMR @ FMR = 0.1% (morphs as references — morphs as probes) [%]

Dataset	FRS	OpenCV	FaceMorpher	StyleGAN2	WebMorph	AMSL
FRLL	<b>FaceNet</b>	<b>83.3 — 72.0</b>	<b>64.5 — 68.2</b>	<b>5.9 — 11.0</b>	<b>82.7 — 70.8</b>	<b>89.2 — 92.5</b>
	ArcFace	59.8 — 73.8	57.6 — 75.3	9.8 — 18.3	60.9 — 73.8	58.0 — 79.4
	<b>VGG</b>	<b>39.7 — 48.6</b>	<b>23.4 — 47.1</b>	<b>3.0 — 9.1</b>	<b>38.2 — 52.2</b>	<b>65.7 — 89.8</b>
	Gabor	87.2 — 100.0	83.9 — 99.4	11.8 — 37.9	85.4 — 100.0	86.3 — 99.9
	ISV	59.8 — 97.8	56.1 — 96.1	9.2 — 43.6	59.5 — 97.4	55.3 — 99.9
FERET	<b>FaceNet</b>	<b>41.1 — 40.6</b>	<b>39.9 — 40.3</b>	<b>1.6 — 1.3</b>	N/A	N/A
	ArcFace	34.6 — 35.2	34.1 — 34.8	2.4 — 2.5	N/A	N/A
	<b>VGG</b>	<b>22.0 — 21.0</b>	<b>20.5 — 18.3</b>	<b>2.0 — 1.5</b>	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	66.6 — 90.9	63.7 — 88.5	1.3 — 40.8	N/A	N/A
	ISV	44.8 — 58.4	42.6 — 56.5	2.7 — 3.4	N/A	N/A
FRGC	<b>FaceNet</b>	<b>6.9 — 5.9</b>	<b>7.0 — 5.7</b>	<b>1.0 — 0.7</b>	N/A	N/A
	ArcFace	11.9 — 10.8	12.1 — 11.2	0.5 — 0.4	N/A	N/A
	<b>VGG</b>	<b>5.5 — 4.5</b>	<b>5.1 — 4.8</b>	<b>0.7 — 0.4</b>	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	7.1 — 80.8	6.7 — 81.0	0.6 — 75.8	N/A	N/A
	ISV	4.2 — 6.5	3.5 — 6.2	0.6 — 0.6	N/A	N/A

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	VGG	22.0 — 21.0	20.5 — 18.3	<b>2.0 — 1.5</b>	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	66.6 — 90.9	63.7 — 88.5	<b>1.3 — 40.8</b>	N/A	N/A
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	VGG	5.5 — 4.5	5.1 — 4.8	<b>0.7 — 0.4</b>	N/A	N/A
	Gabor	7.1 — 80.8	6.7 — 81.0	<b>0.6 — 75.8</b>	N/A	N/A
	ISV	4.2 — 6.5	3.5 — 6.2	<b>0.6 — 0.6</b>	N/A	N/A

Higher score indicates higher vulnerability

# Observations

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- More accurate face recognition system → more vulnerable to morphing attacks
  - In line with observations made for presentation attacks.
  - Especially evident when comparing FaceNet with VGG-Face.
  - Regardless of whether used as references or probes.



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- More accurate face recognition system → more vulnerable to morphing attacks
  - In line with observations made for presentation attacks.
  - Especially evident when comparing FaceNet with VGG-Face.
  - Regardless of whether used as **references** or **probes**.
- StyleGAN 2 morphs do **not** pose significant threats to SOTA recognition systems.
  - Slight increase in MMPMR for FRLL morphs → high quality original images may lead to slightly more accurate morphs.

# Conclusion

- Conducted extensive vulnerability assessments (5 recognition systems on 3 image databases with 5 different morphing attacks in 2 different scenarios).
- An accurate face recognition system FaceNet is more vulnerable to the morphing attacks than others.
- GAN-based morphs do not yet pose a significant threat to modern recognition systems.
  - Additional **identity loss** to ensure both source bona fide identities are *preserved* in their projections → the final morphs may become more threatening.

# Thank you !



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